Emergency within an emergency: Somali IDPs by Hassan Noor
2FMr 28
Hardly any Somali family 
has escaped the experience of 
displacement. Displacement was 
first experienced in the mid 1970s 
and 1980s, both as a result of 
drought and attacks on civilians 
launched by Siad Barre, the military 
ruler of Somalia from 1969 to 1991. 
Displacement in northern Somalia 
displaced hundreds of thousands 
who became refugees in Ethiopia. 
Displacement escalated massively 
when civil war broke out in the early 
1990s. In terms of the proportion 
of the population displaced, the 
Somali displacement crisis is worse 
than that of Darfur or Iraq.
‘IDP’ is a useful term for purposes of 
definition but it does not capture the 
kind of reality that Somalia is now 
facing. It is important to distinguish 
between CDPs – conflict-displaced 
people – and EDPs – environmentally 
displaced people. Conflict-related 
displacement in Somalia is the 
direct result of the civil war and 
turbulent politics. CDPs are estimated 
to number around 600,000 with 
possible conflict in Kismayo and 
Mogadishu potentially exacerbating 
the figure to nearly a million. CDPs 
have been forced to leave their 
homes for security reasons, a type of 
displacement with a huge long-term 
impact on families and continued 
dependence on humanitarian 
assistance. Fighting between the 
Islamists and the Ethiopian-backed 
Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) erupted as civilians struggled 
to cope with massive flooding in 
riverine areas of south Somalia in 
November and December which 
added 300,000 to the existing number 
of EDPs displaced by drought.
Somalia’s forgotten displaced
Amidst the complexity of recurrent 
displacement in Somalia, few notice 
that there are displaced people who 
international media report that over 300,000 somalis have 
been newly displaced by fighting in Mogadishu. Conflict-
related displacement hits the headlines but the numbers 
displaced by environmental change are also colossal. the 
international response remains woefully inadequate.
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are neither IDPs nor Somalis. These 
refugees include significant numbers 
of Ethiopians (members of the Oromo 
ethnic group – the country’s largest) 
who have fled once more to escape 
Ethiopian soldiers supporting the 
TFG. There are also Tanzanians (from 
the island of Zanzibar) and Sudanese. 
They have serious unmet needs for 
protection and assistance. Their 
numbers cannot be quantified but it is 
estimated there are several thousand.  
Significant numbers of Somalis have 
been refouled and the phenomenon is 
increasing. Saudi Arabia has forcibly 
repatriated Somalis for many years. 
As the numbers of Somalis and 
Ethiopian Oromo in Kenya, Uganda 
and Yemen continue to rise, it is likely 
that more will be sent back to Somalia 
against their will. Kenya has recently 
closed access to the thousands of 
Somalis encamped along its border. 
Despite the recent enactment of a 
new refugee law1 it has allegedly 
detained and forcibly returned 
Somalis without UNHCR having had 
the chance of determining whether 
they qualified for refugee status. More 
and more Somalis – and non-Somalis 
fleeing Somalia – are likely to end up 
entrusting their lives to traffickers as 
they seek to reach safety in Europe.2     
Urgent national and 
international action needed
Since 1991, there has been no national 
entity responsible for IDP response. 
The gradual attempt of the TFG to 
re-install itself in Mogadishu has 
unleashed considerable effort on 
several sides to take ownership of 
the IDP issue. The newly-established 
National Refugee Commission has 
declared that IDPs fall under its 
mandate but its capacity is limited 
by the TFG’s inability to regain 
control of Mogadishu, let alone 
the whole of Somalia. The duty to 
provide protection and assistance to 
the Somali population thus remains 
with the international community 
and Somali NGOs, often supported 
financially by local businessmen. 
The Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement are largely unknown 
in Somalia. The protection of IDPs 
is, first and foremost, a duty of 
the national authorities and it is 
imperative that members of the 
TFG and regional states – as well as 
non-state actors – are encouraged 
to take the lead. UN agencies, the 
ICRC and international NGOs 
cannot substitute for competent 
local authorities. Somalis need to 
be helped to understand their role 
and responsibility of care with 
regard to both IDPs and refugees. 
In Somalia, as in Darfur, displacement 
is a reminder of the conflict that needs 
to be resolved. There is a need for a 
robust response from the UN and 
the African Union to end the sixteen-
year-long cycle of violence and 
displacement. The AU is faced with 
a difficult mission. The AU must not 
again be deprived of the resources it 
needs to achieve its objectives. There 
is also a need for clarity regarding 
its mission. When I was in Darfur 
it was apparent that AU forces had 
little understanding of their mandate: 
indeed I never got to see what it 
was, for it was forever being drafted. 
Too much is as stake for Africa to 
allow another poorly-equipped and 
malfunctioning AU mission with only 
a limited and time-bound mandate 
to be set up only to fail once again.
Promotion of understanding towards 
the respect of law is a key tool 
in resolving conflicts, protecting 
civilians and realising good 
governance. Somalia urgently needs 
the kinds of rule of law programmes 
which have been developed in 
Darfur.3 Justice and Confidence 
Centres run by local communities 
could help the transition to peace.
A major obstacle to a more concerted 
humanitarian response is donor 
reluctance to engage in Somalia, 
mostly related to previous failure to 
achieve tangible improvement. The 
2007 Coordinated Humanitarian 
Appeal (CAP) for Somalia – outlined 
by OCHA in November 2006 
– identifies one million people in 
need of assistance, which includes 
400,000 IDPs. By April 2007, the CAP 
was covered for 33%, with most 
funds going to the food sector. Less 
than 10% of the health, protection, 
shelter and agriculture sectors 
were covered, while education and 
recovery programmes had received 
no funding at all. Along with the 
extremely complex political context, 
chronic under-funding of the CAP 
is a serious obstacle to a successful 
reconciliation and reconstruction 
process in Somalia. While political 
diplomacy is working towards 
national reconciliation, recent 
UN advocacy for Somalia called 
on donors to consider long-term 
funding, which would demonstrate 
real international commitment 
to the many aspects of Somalia’s 
recovery, particularly in relatively 
stable Somaliland and Puntland.
Insecurity in Mogadishu and 
surrounding areas, as well as 
roadblocks, port closures and marine 
piracy, are creating difficulties for 
humanitarian access, the importation 
of food and non-food commodities 
and inter-regional trade flows 
in southern and central Somalia. 
Activities in the main Mogadishu 
port have slowed down with a wide 
knock-on effect on the supply and 
price of imported food and non-food 
commodities. Despite the availability 
of locally produced cereals at 
relatively low prices, food access for 
displaced populations, especially 
the poorest, is difficult due to the 
sudden disruption in livelihoods and 
loss of income-earning abilities.
The most recent displacement from 
Mogadishu occurred in a climate 
of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians. Many of them have had to 
endure extortion and harassment, 
especially when they cannot enjoy 
clan-based protection. Most IDPs have 
largely been left to their own devices, 
and information on living conditions 
and protection issues remains scarce. 
Morbidity, mainly from diarrhoeal 
diseases (due to consumption of 
unsafe water) and malaria, is on the 
increase in many places in south and 
central Somalia. A marked increase in 
Acute Watery Diarrhoea (AWD) and 
cholera has been reported, mostly 
linked to post-flood conditions, 
and to lack of safe drinking water 
and sanitation. The areas with 
the highest AWD prevalence 
(Mogadishu and surrounding 
regions) are also the areas most 
difficult to access for treatment. 
Somalia remains chronically food-
insecure and malnutrition remains 
a serious problem. The riverine 
areas continue to be extremely food-
insecure due to the aftermath of the 
floods and insecurity. In addition, 
the rains have failed in large parts 
of Somalia and food insecurity 
is expected to worsen. IDPs are 
generally particularly vulnerable 
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to malnutrition, as they have fewer 
possibilities to support themselves.
Due to widespread insecurity, the 
international presence in south and 
central Somalia remains weak and 
inconsistent, and highly insufficient 
considering the enormous needs 
of the population, especially in 
and around Mogadishu and other 
southern towns. 
In the absence 
of a functioning 
government, the 
UN and national 
and international 
NGOs are often 
the only service 
providers 
and interact 
directly with 
clan leaders and 
local authorities. 
Especially in the 
south, in a context 
of ever-changing 
local power 
structures and 
clan affiliations, 
negotiating access 
is difficult. 
The premature 
and abrupt 
termination of 
the UN mission 
in Somalia in 
1995 continues 
to have a 
negative impact on the quality 
and quantity of humanitarian 
assistance to Somali IDPs. Since the 
withdrawal, the international aid 
community responsible for Somalia 
has been based in Nairobi. The 
UN’s operational presence has been 
fairly consistent in Somaliland and 
Puntland but has remained sparse in 
south and central Somalia, ensured 
largely through Somali national 
staff. Concern Worldwide is the only 
international organisation that has 
maintained full presence in southern 
Somalia since the 1991 operations. 
ICRC has maintained access to most 
of the southern regions through 
continued negotiations with local 
leaders. Some INGOs maintain a 
presence through national staff. 
The Somali diaspora has made 
outstanding efforts to support 
displaced civilians and raised 
hundreds of thousands of dollars 
during the flooding in late December. 
It is unfortunate that their efforts are 
not linked to overall coordination 
mechanisms. Links need to be forged 
between INGOs and the diaspora to 
give greater impetus to joint advocacy.
The operational gap between Nairobi 
and the field level remains, despite 
recent attempts to bridge it. Somalia 
is one of the four countries where 
the new cluster approach4 – a key 
element of the UN’s humanitarian 
reform process – is being rolled out. 
The cluster approach has helped 
agencies recognise response gaps 
but has not consistently led to filling 
them. Collaboration between UN 
agencies and NGOs, both local and 
international, is not fully in place. 
As lead agency for the protection 
cluster, UNHCR has taken on a 
coordination and gaps analysis role 
with regard to the response to the 
internal displacement situation. Its 
operational presence in Somalia is 
limited. The humanitarian response 
could profit from better collaboration 
with local actors, who often work 
in areas considered inaccessible 
by the international community. 
In early 2007 John Holmes, the 
newly-appointed UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator (HC), called on the 
international aid community to 
re-engage in Mogadishu, taking 
advantage of the fact that the TFG 
was moving back to the capital, and 
to meet the high expectations of the 
population for reconciliation, security 
and resumption of basic services. This 
call for immediate re-engagement 
was met with scepticism by some 
humanitarian actors. At the end of 
March 2007 the security situation in 
Mogadishu had degenerated so far as 
to make humanitarian access virtually 
impossible even 
for local NGOs. 
In May John 
Holmes became 
the most senior 
UN official to 
visit Mogadishu 
in a decade. 
Urging the TFG 
to provide a 
more enabling 
operating 
environment for 
aid workers, he 
reported that 
aid workers are 
only reaching 
about a third of 
those afflicted 
by Mogadishu’s 
worst fighting for 
years. Hundreds 
of thousands 
of people who 
have fled outside 
the city and 
surrounding 
regions live 
without 
food, water and shelter and need 
immediate assistance. “In terms of 
numbers and access to them,” Holmes 
told a news conference, “Somalia is a 
worse displacement crisis than Darfur 
or Chad or anywhere else this year.”
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law issues. This article is written 
in a personal capacity and does 
not necessarily represent the 
views of Concern Worldwide. 
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